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25X1 Approved For Release 2002/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A094800070001-1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 9 November 1959 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Soviet Bloc - Greece: The USSR and Rumania are intensifying their campaign of "friendship" with Greece, apparently as part of their effort to obtain a meeting of Balkan leaders to discuss outstanding issues affecting the area and the bloc's proposals for a Balkan nuclear-free zone. At press conferences in Athens on 6 November, Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev publicly renewed the Soviet invitation for Prime Minister Karamanlis to visit Moscow. and visiting Rumanian Deputy Premier Joja proposed that KaramanIis meet with Rumanian leaders in Bucharest in preparation for a Balkan conference. The Greek Government has already refused a private invitation for a visit and is likely to be cautious about the Rumanian suggestions; however, Greek leftist and other opposition elements are likely to exert pressure in favor of the bloc's overtures. 25X1

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

, ' A	25X1 approved For Release 2 002/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A09 4800070001-1	
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	Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Afghan Government apparently has encountered serious resistance to its authority in the Pushtu tribal territory along the Pakistani frontier. The "revolt" against Kabul	25X1
	by the Mangal tribe reportedly has already spread to two other	
0/2	Pushtu tribes in the area. The recent appearance of Afghan jet bombers over the border may have been part of an effort by Prime Minister Daud to suppress the uprising before it spreads further.	
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oK	Philippines: The Philippine elections to be held on 10 November for provincial and municipal posts and for one third of the 24-man Senate offer little prospect for change. The incumbent Nacionalista party suffers from internal rivalries and the unpopularity of President Garcia and may, even though its opposition is divided, lose some of its Senate seats; it now holds all but two. The elections will be followed by continual political maneuvering in preparation for the 1961 presidential election. (Page 4)	25X1
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Y	III. THE WEST	
	Guatemala: The re-entry into active politics of former President Arevalo, whose candidacy for the 6 December congressional elections has just been announced, is likely further to inflame	

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DAILY BRIEF

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rightist elements which have long been plotting to oust the ineffective Ydigoras government. Arevalo, a rabid critic of the United States, has been in exile since 1954 but retains wide popularity in Guatemala. Financial backing has been promised him by the Castro regime in Cuba for his effort to regain control of Guatemala's powerful leftist forces.

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR and Rumania Intensify Pressure on Greece

The USSR and Rumania are increasing their overtures of "friendship" for Greece with the announced aim of "dispelling the spirit of the cold war in the Balkans." The bloc leaders apparently hope that creating the impression that their relations with the Karamanlis government are improving will further their campaign for a Balkan conference. Invitations to the Greek leader to visit Moscow and Bucharest were tendered at nearly simultaneous press conferences in Athens on 6 November by Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev and Rumanian Deputy Premier Joja. Athens had previously rejected an earlier private invitation for Karamanlis to visit the USSR and a feeler to the Greek Government for Khrushchev to stop over in Athens en route to Paris.

Joja used his 11-day visit in Athens to advance bloc views and sound out Greek political opinion. According to Kathimerini, a progovernment Athens newspaper, Joja called for increased trade and expounded the virtues of Rumanian Premier Stoica's proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans--a plan initially offered in 1957 and repeated this summer. He also claimed that Ankara's acceptance of IRBM bases was preventing international detente. Joja evidently was not empowered to settle basic economic and political issues which Athens has previously indicated are essential for a creation of an atmosphere of confidence and hence probably a prerequisite for any consideration by the Greeks of a bilateral heads-of-state meeting.

25X1	The timing of these initiatives is probably designed to effect maximum exploitation from the Turkish decision to accept missile bases. Bloc leaders are also aware that certain Greek leftist and non-Communist opposition politicians will probably increase pressure on the Karamanlis government for a Balkan summit.

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_	Afghan Government Apparently Encountering Serious Tribal Unrest	
	The Afghan Government apparently is encountering serious resistance to its authority in the Pushtu tribal territory near the Pakistani border. Mangal tribesmen reportedly have attacked a government road-building crew, inflicting many casualties, and an Afghan company of 100 soldiers sent to put down armed activity by the Mangals has disappeared,	
25X1	The unrest by the Mangalspublicized by Karachi on 1 Novemberalready has spread to two other Pushtu tribes. The tribes are strongly opposed to Kabul's efforts to build roads	
	into their territories, since the roads will strengthen central government control over the region. In addition, conservative religious sentiment among the tribes, which are devoutly Moslem, has probably been offended by the Afghan Government's moves since August to end the custom of keeping women veiled.	
(6	Afghan Prime Minister Daud will probably make a strong	
	effort to suppress the tribal unrest before it spreads further, possibly by sending in troop reinforcements using modern, Soviet-supplied weapons. Kabul reportedly has already used planes against the tribes; this probably explains the appearance last month of twin-jet hombers over the tribal territory.	

rs over the tribal territory, as reported by the Pakistanis.

The Afghan and Pakistani governments have expressed their desire to improve relations, and Daud and Pakistani President Ayub have indicated their willingness to talk with each other. Growing unrest among the tribes, accompanied by increasing propaganda warfare between the two countries, makes settlement of the Pushtoonistan dispute unlikely in the near future.

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Philippine Elections

The Philippine elections to be held on 10 November are regarded primarily as a means of consolidating power for the presidential and congressional election in 1961. At stake this year are the governorships of the 54 provinces, mayoralties in 24 chartered cities, and municipal offices, as well as eight of the 24 Senate seats.

The incumbent Nacionalista party, which controls the vast majority of local offices and all but two Senate seats, has been internally strained during the campaign by fear of association with the unpopularity of President Garcia and by the determination of rivals to deny him complete control of the party machine. These factors may result in the party's losing some of its Senate strength and some governorships, but it still retains significant advantages in its well-entrenched machine and its ability to make political use of government funds. The Nacionalistas are additionally favored by the failure of their opposition, the Liberal and the Grand Alliance parties, to form a unified antiadministration coalition.

Despite Nacionalista attempts to arouse national feeling through a "Filipino First" campaign theme, the major issues have centered on charges of corruption and inefficiency in the Garcia administration. These charges, together with reports of pre-election violence, have renewed fears of election irregularities, although there have been no serious indications of fraud or terrorism. Nevertheless, the elections may be followed by a period of intense rivalry and political jockeying which offers little prospect for increased governmental responsibility in advance of the 1961 presidential race. 25X1

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Ex-President Arevalo Re-enters Guatemalan Politics

Juan Jose Arevalo, rabidly anti-US former president of Guatemala who has been in exile since 1954, has launched his candidacy for deputy in the 6 December congressional elections as the first step in a bid to regain control of the country's powerful leftist forces. His administration, in power from 1945 to 1951, paced the way for Communist domination of the succeeding Arbenz regime. Nevertheless, a very large number of Guatemalans, including many who deplore the Communist influence over his successor, esteem him as the only president ever to carry out a program of social and economic reform, and his popularity continues widespread.

Arevalo returned to his professorship in Venezuela on 27 October after a ten-day visit to Cuba as the guest of Raul Castro and other officials and student leaders. While there he roundly applauded Fidel Castro's violent attacks on the United States and apparently concluded an agreement under discussion for some months, assuring his followers financial support from the Cuban Government. Arevalo told partisans visiting him in Cuba that the money would be available for the election campaign.

Arevalo's re-entry into active politics is likely to further inflame rightist civilian and military elements which have long been plotting to oust weak President Ydigoras, whom they accuse of facilitating leftist gains in Guatemala. Ydigoras has, in fact, subsidized the pro-Arevalo Authentic Revolutionary party in an effort to weaken the dominant leftist group, the moderate Revolutionary party (PR), currently under anti-Arevalo leadership.

Ydigoras, who has no effective political vehicle of his own, has maintained his tenuous hold on power by manipulating the various mutually hostile political factions against one another. He may lose control during the potentially explosive period leading up to and immediately following the elections, which are to replace half the 66 members of the unicameral Congress. Fear of Arevalo could lead to an alliance of expediency between the PR and rightist factions that could result in the President's ouster.

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